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BAIL-ANCIENT AND MODERN
CHARLES S. DESMOND*
T HE subject of criminal bail, which interests, usually, only those accused of
crime, and the lawyers who prosecute and defend them, has unexpectedly
produced front-page news throughout America. Accused Communists are held
in high bail, furnished by their supporters. Bail is fixed for recalcitrant witnesses
before courts and Congressional committees. Convicted defendants are granted or
refused bail pending their appeals. Some of their lawyers, charged with contempt,
must produce bail for themselves. Bail is fixed, revoked and reinstated in succes-
sive legal proceedings bewildering to the newspaper reader who tries to keep him-
self informed about subversive people and their subversive doings. Some of the
convicted Communists, after unsuccessful appeals to the Supreme Court, fail to
appear to serve their sentences. Thereupon officers of the Civil Rights Congress
Bail Fund, which provided the bail monies, are brought into court, refuse to answer
questions as to the sources of that fund, and find themselves under the necessity
of putting up still more bail to answer charges of contempt of court. The amounts
fixed for bail differ widely from defendant to defendant, and from Judge to Judge.
An inquiring citizen finds it all hard to follow.
The basic idea is, of course, simple enough, however obscured by unfamiliar
terminology. The central thought that a person detained pursuant to legal pro-
cedures is, on the putting up of property as security for his later presence when
required by the court, placed in the "friendly custody" of his sureties or bondsmen
instead of remaining in prison. Bail is required, too, from convicted defendants
on appeal, from witnesses under certain circumstances, and also, on occasion, in
civil cases, but the bail we are discussing here is that taken from defendants in
criminal prosecutions.
Part of the perplexity which surrounds the whole matter of bail is caused by
the use of the word "bail" itself to several meanings. As a noun, it means the
security given, or the person giving it, that is, it describes either the property de-
posited to pledge a person's appearance in court when his presence shall be re-
quired, or it can refer to the person who puts up that property for that purpose.
As a verb, "to bail" is either to grant liberty to a person under arrest, or to provide
the guarantees on which he is liberated. In an attempt at clarity, the word is used
in this article to denote'the security itself.
Like so many of our legal forms and institutions, the bail system now in
general use in the United States comes to us from England, and its origins are in
the dim far past of history. After centuries of development in Britain, its practices
were first codified into English statute law in 1275, in the reign of the great law-
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giver, Edward I, and the essential features then written out persist to our own day
and our own country. But, long before that, there had been customary and tradi-
tional methods whereby a man or group gave pledges to make certain the appear-
ance of an accused for trial, or payment by him for his wrongdoing. Indeed, bail
is as old as English law itself, and back of that its beginnings are traced by scholars
to tribal customs on the Continent. In primitive societies, before there were
courts or lawyers or written laws, injuries demanded prompt satisfaction, either in
blood or treasure. When a man was killed, his tribe or family wreaked vengeance
on the slayer unless the slayer paid a proper price in property, or with his own
life. To save his life the killer promised to pay, and his friend or his tribe stood
back of his promise till he could redeem it. Perhaps at times the surety gave him-
self as hostage, that is, physically surrendered himself into the custody of the ag-
grieved group till payment was made for the wrong. Gradually the "blood feud,"
and vengeance, ceased to be customary. And so, long before there were courts or
judges, compensation came to be measured in money. In seventh century England
there was actually a sliding scale of rates for the life or limb of every man, up to
and including the king himself. The arrangemefits for these settlements were
for centuries carried on between families or tribes, till the time came when the
central authority of the King intervened, and courts and judicial procedures were
invented to hear the grievances and deny or compel redress. Thus Anglo-Saxon
criminal law was born, with the state itself exacting punishment from the guilty.
At some point in this long, slow historical development, English feudal lords
were required by royal decree to stand surety for their whole households. Later
on (since there were still no policemen) each man had his own surety, who was
ready for duty at all times, or hailed in to serve in a particular case. After the
Norman conquest, when the invaders brought with them to England their favorite
method of settling disputes by the duel, sureties were still used to guarantee the
presence of the parties at those sanguinary exercises.
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the English kings sent forth
their traveling justices for infrequent appearances in the rural counties, it was
important that local officials have power to release on bail, otherwise an accused
citizen might languish in jail for years, while the leisurely judicial train was on
its way to his locality. So the Sheriff was given power to take pledges from sure-
ties in all cases but those of the great crimes of treason and homicide. As to those,
release could be had only on the King's command and by the King's own officers.
But some of the Sheriffs were venal men too, grasping and greedy even for those
corrupt days. The sheriffs demanded and got huge fees for accepting bail, and
went so far, says tradition, as to clap citizens into jail on trumped-up charges, in
order to make them pay bribes for being released on bail. Even when the king
himself sent out his order for release, still the sheriff had to have his "gift." But,
in those days, as in these, official corruption brought investigation and reform leg-
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islation. Thus, out of all this, came the statute of the year 1275, detailing pro-
cedures for bail (without sheriff's "gifts") strikingly similar to the bail statutes of
present-day America.
The United States has fifty different legal systems (those of the forty-eight
states, the Federal government and the District of Columbia) so it is impossible to
set forth any law of bail as generally applicable throughout the country. Itow-
ever, most states make release on bail, before trial and conviction, a matter of right
in misdemeanor cases, and a matter of judicial discretion in cases of felony, includ-
ing homicides. That idea of "judicial discretion" has its own difficulties. It means
that there are no set rules as to whether or not persons charged with felony are
to be at large pending trial, and if so, how much money or property must be put
up for security. The judge uses his common sense and experience. He must look
into the defendant's past record, find out something about the nature and serious-
ness of the charge and the probability of guilt, then make an informed guess as
to the likelihood that the accused will or will not show up for trial. In other
words it is the judge's job to figure out how much security is, in reason and com-
mon sense, sufficient to insure that the defendant will appear for trial. This
judicial task is at times a most difficult one. The judge's duty to the public is to
see that the defendant be kept locked up if necessary, but, on the other hand,
the defendant is presumed to be innocent and keeping him in jail while awaiting
trial may be undeserved punishment. The law generally favors bail and the
judge tries to follow that trend. But he knows that, while in theory a bailed-out
defendant stays "in the friendly custody" of individual sureties, actually he is under
no restraint, and the surety may be a corporation authorized by law to write bail
bonds for fees.
These judicial difficulties in determing bail questions are no new thing. When
Lord Baltimore was hailed into an English court in 1768 on a charge of rape, the
court took into consideration his voluntary surrender as showing he had no inten-
tion to flee, and, noting that the defendant's large properties would be forfeited
if he absconded, named the amount of eight thousand pounds.' Jefferson Davis,
president of the Confederacy, indicted for treason, was, after long imprisonment in
Fortress Monroe, allowed at large on bail of $100,000, put up by ten well-known
Americans including Horace Greeley and Cornelius Vanderbilt, who were relieved
from responsibility when a general amnesty was ordered, and the indictment was
dismissed 2 "Boss" Tweed, despoiler of New York's public treasuries, was (in a
civil fraud case brought by the City of New York to collect $6,000,000 of the
great plunderer's graft) held in bail of $3,000,000, a truly enormous sum in 1 8 7 5
In 1947, in New York's highest court, $250,000 bail was held to be excessive for
1. Rex 'v. Lord Baltimore, 4 Burrows (K.B.) 2179 (1768).
2. Case of Davis, Fed. Cases No. 3621a, 7 Fed. Cas. 63.
3. People v. Tweed, 5 Hun 382; appl. dismsd. 63 N. Y. 202 (1875).
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one Lobell, accused (and later convicted) of stealing several hundred thousand
dollars, but who, like Lord Baltimore, had voluntarily surrendered himself and as
to whom there was no showing of any intention to flee.4 Later the same year but
under vastly different circumstances, the same court refused to interfere with the
fixation of bail at the same amount, $250,000 each, for Joseph Rao and Michael
Coppola, held as "material witnesses" in connection with the unsolved slaying of
an election worker named Scotoriggio.5 A year earlier, a New York City General
Sessions justice ordered that the admission to bail of an accused seller of heroin
required security of $150,000.6 An Illinois court some years ago reduced from
$50,000 to $5,000 the bail of a defendant charged only with vagrancy,T and a Lou-
isiana court thought that $40,000 was too high, and $7,500 about right for bail
for a lawyer charged with the improbable crime of bombing a building.8 A Fed-
eral Circuit Court sitting in New York City, overruled the fixation of $500,000 bail
in the case of Serge Rubenstein, the court indicating that it thought $50,000 more
nearly right.9 Rubenstein was accused of making false statements to his Draft
Board in World War II. In 1942, New York State's appellate courts refused to
set aside a lower court order denying bail to one Jacob Shapiro, an alleged extor-
tionist who had offered to post $50,000 as security.10 One of the quirks of bail law
is that, although the Federal Constitution and the constitutions of most states forbid
"excessive bail," courts may, at least in felony cases, constitutionally refuse to set
any bail at all. The anomaly, however, is more apparent than real, since there
are two separate problems involved in every discretionary bail application: is the
defendant to be released at all, and if so, for what amount of bail? It is only
when the judge in his discretion answers "yes" to the first question that he comes
to, and is constitutionally limited as to, the amount of bail.
So, like most law questions, when stripped of procedural niceties, the matter
of bail is not so complicated after all, and, like most of our legal rules and systems,
it works pretty well. The facts of criminal cases are as various as the characters
and circumstances of the people who come to trial, and no mathematical formulae
can be devised to deal scientifically with all of them. In the end, bail or no bail
and if so, how much, is a question for the common sense of the judge who sits in
the particular case. Perhaps it might be wise to require, as an extra precaution
against fixation of excessive bail, the concurrence of two out of a panel of three
judges, in order to impose any bail over, say, $25,000.
4. People ex rel LobeZ v. McDonnell 296 N. Y. 109, 71 N. E. 2d 423 (1947).
5. People ex rel Rao 'v. Adams 296 N. Y. 231, 72 N. E. 2d. 170 (1947).
6. People ex reZ Gagliano v. Warden 188 Misc. 800, 67 N. Y. S. 2d. 220 (Sup
Ct., 1947).
7. People ex rel Sammons v. Snow 340 Ill. 464, 173 N. E. 8 (1930).
8. State v. Wertheimer 183 La. 388, 163 So. 545 (1935).
9. U. S. ex reZ Rubenstein V. Mulcahy 155 F. 2d. 1002 (2 Cir., 1946).
10. People ex rel Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison 290 N. Y. 393, 49 N. E. 2d.
498 (1943).
